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Charles Gardner Geyh
Methods of judicial selection & their
impact on judicial independence

Within the legal community judicial

independence is understood, not as an
intrinsic good or an end in itself, but as
a means to achieve other ends.1 If judges are independent–if they are insulated from political and other controls that
could undermine their impartial judgment–it is thought that judges will be
better able to uphold the rule of law, preserve the separation of powers, and promote due process of law.2 Scholars, judges, and lawyers often acknowledge that
judicial independence has institutional
and decisional dimensions: institutional independence concerns the capacity
of the judiciary as a separate branch of
government to resist encroachments
from the political branches and thereby
preserve the separation of powers; decisional independence, in contrast, concerns the capacity of individual judges
to decide cases without threats or intimidation that could interfere with their
ability to uphold the rule of law.3
Properly understood then, judicial
independence is circumscribed by the
Charles Gardner Geyh is John F. Kimberling
Professor of Law at Indiana University, Bloomington.
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purposes it serves: decisional independence, for example, does not mean freedom from all external constraints, but
only those constraints that interfere
with a judge’s ability to uphold the rule
of law. Indeed, some forms of independence from decisional constraint, such
as the freedom to decide cases for the
bene½t of friends or in exchange for
bribes, are antithetical to the rule-oflaw values that judicial independence is
1 The ideas in this essay were ½rst presented
at the 2007 conference on The Debate over Judicial Elections and State Court Judicial Selection, convened by the Sandra Day O’Connor
Project on the State of the Judiciary at Georgetown University Law Center. A modi½ed version of this essay appears in The Georgetown
Journal of Legal Ethics 21 (4) (Fall 2008). Thanks
to Bert Brandenburg, Barry Friedman, Steve
Burbank, and Roy Schotland for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay and
to Ted Brass½eld for his research assistance.
2 Stephen B. Burbank and Barry Friedman,
“Reconsidering Judicial Independence,” in
Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. Burbank and Friedman (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2002), 9, 11–14.
3 Charles Gardner Geyh, When Courts & Congress Collide: The Struggle for Control of America’s Judicial System (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2006), 6–7.

supposed to further. And so, if judicial
independence is to achieve its goals,
it must operate within speci½ed constraints. It must, in other words, be
tempered by judicial accountability.
Like judicial independence, judicial
accountability is not an end in itself. It,
too, serves other ends: to promote the
rule of law, institutional responsibility,
and public con½dence in the courts.
And like judicial independence, judicial
accountability has multiple forms: institutional accountability mechanisms
hold judges answerable collectively for
their conduct as a separate branch of
government, for example by subjecting
court budgets to legislative oversight;
behavioral accountability mechanisms
hold individual judges to account for
their conduct on and off the bench, for
example by subjecting them to discipline
for being abusive to litigants or accepting inappropriate gifts from lawyers who
appear before them; and decisional accountability makes judges answerable
for their judicial rulings, for example by
subjecting their decisions to appellate
review.4 As to decisional accountability,
however, suitable mechanisms are ideally limited to those that promote the rule
of law by correcting judicial error without obliterating decisional independence by subjecting judges to threats or
controls that could cause them to disregard the law and implement the preferences of those who threaten or control
them.
The perennial policy struggle is to
strike an optimal balance between judicial independence and accountability, to ensure that judges are independent enough to follow the facts and law

without fear or favor, but not so independent as to disregard the facts or law
to the detriment of the rule of law and
public con½dence in the courts. The
American Bar Association’s Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, some variation of
which has been adopted by almost every state supreme court, seeks to structure judicial conduct to preserve this
balance. The 2007 Code tells judges that
they “shall act at all times in a manner
that promotes public con½dence in the
independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”;5 “shall uphold and
apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial of½ce fairly and impartially”;6 “shall not be swayed by public
clamor or fear of criticism”;7 “shall not
permit family, social, political, ½nancial,
or other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or
judgment”;8 and “shall not convey or
permit others to convey the impression
that any person or organization is in a
position to influence the judge.”9
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I

n the context of state judicial selection,
the struggle to balance independence
and accountability has played itself out
over the course of more than two centuries, as ½ve distinct methods of selecting judges–each striking the balance
in different ways–have vied for preeminence. In the fledgling states, all judges
were selected by one of two methods:
gubernatorial appointment with legislative con½rmation (½ve states) or legisla5 aba Model Code of Judicial Conduct (American Bar Association, 2007).
6 Ibid., Rule 2.2.
7 Ibid., Rule 2.4(A).

4 Charles Gardner Geyh, “Rescuing Judicial
Accountability from the Realm of Political
Rhetoric,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 56
(2006): 911.

8 Ibid., Rule 2.4(B).
9 Ibid., Rule 2.4(C).
Dædalus Fall 2008
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tive appointment (eight states).10 The
colonial courts had been unhappily dependent on the crown, and the new
states were committed to curbing their
judiciaries’ dependence on the executive branch–which is not to say that
the new states were committed to an
independent judiciary. Several states
subjected their judges to a variety of
legislative branch controls, including
reappointment, which led to a series of
independence-threatening confrontations with state legislatures during the
1780s that troubled the framers of the
U.S. Constitution enough for them to
embed in Article III tenure and salary
protections for federal judges.
During the Jacksonian Era of the 1820s
and 1830s, populist calls for judicial accountability initiated a movement to select judges via a third method: partisan
judicial elections. Although the early catalyst for partisan judicial elections may
have been a desire for greater accountability, the partisan election movement
did not take hold until after the Jacksonians lost influence, led by reformers
who argued that elected judges who derived their authority from the people
would be more independent-minded
than handpicked friends of governors,
or jurists subject to the beck and call of
legislatures. Indeed, University of Virginia law professor Caleb Nelson found
that the impetus for the judicial election
movement was a desire to promote judicial independence from the political
branches, rather than to increase democratic accountability for judicial decisions.11 Mississippi broke the ice in 1832,
10 Anthony Champagne and Judith Haydel,
“Introduction,” in Judicial Reform in the States,
ed. Champagne and Haydel (Lanham, Md.:
University Press of America, 1993), 3.
11 Caleb Nelson, “A Reevaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Ju-
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and by 1909 thirty-½ve states either entered the Union with judiciaries selected
by partisan election or had converted to
partisan elections from appointive systems.
In the early twentieth century, elected judiciaries were increasingly viewed
as incompetent and corrupt. During the
Progressive Era, worries that partisan
elections led to the selection of lessthan-capable and less-quali½ed judges
who were beholden to party bosses culminated in a fourth form of judicial selection: the nonpartisan election. By
1930, twelve new states had adopted
nonpartisan elections as the selection
method for their judiciaries.
In the minds of some, however, nonpartisan elections left voters with precious little information upon which to
cast an informed ballot, which led to the
selection of less-capable and less-quali½ed judges. In the minds of others, contested elections–partisan or not–failed
to divorce judges suf½ciently from the
political process.12 In 1913, a ½fth method of judicial selection was devised: a
“merit selection” system, in which judges were appointed by the governor from
a pool of candidates whose quali½cadiciary in Antebellum America,” American
Journal of Legal History 37 (1993): 190. See
also Kermit L. Hall, “Progressive Reform
and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme
Court Judges, 1850–1920,” American Bar
Foundation Research Journal 9 (1984): 345; F.
Andrew Hanssen, “Learning About Judicial
Independence: Institutional Changes in the
State Courts,” Journal of Legal Studies 33
(2004): 445–448; Roy A. Schotland, “Myth,
Reality Past and Present, and Judicial Elections,” Indiana Law Review 35 (2002): 661–
662.
12 Charles Sheldon and Linda Maule, Choosing Justice: The Recruitment of State and Federal Judges (Pullman, Wash.: wsu Press, 1997),
6–7.

tions had been reviewed and approved
by an independent commission. Judges
so appointed would then run unopposed
later in periodic retention elections, in
which voters would decide whether the
judge in question should be retained
for another term. Missouri adopted the
½rst merit selection plan in 1940, and
by 1989 twenty-three states had commission-based appointive systems (with
and without retention elections) to select some or all of their judges.
More recently, the merit selection
movement has stalled. Constitutional
amendments to establish merit selection systems in Florida, Michigan, Ohio,
and South Dakota have been rejected
by voters, and reformers in other jurisdictions have struggled unsuccessfully
to place merit selection proposals on
their ballots, while in some merit selection states there have been calls for
a return to contested elections.13
Meanwhile, nonpartisan elections
have enjoyed a renaissance. Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
and North Carolina moved from partisan to nonpartisan election systems in
the past thirty years. And in 2003 the
American Bar Association retreated
from its previous position of exclusive
support for merit selection, to a more
nuanced series of positions, one being
that “[f]or states that retain contested
elections as a means to select their judges, all such elections should be non-partisan and conducted in a non-partisan
manner.”14

Today, the American Judicature Society reports15 that, at the supreme court
level, four states select judges by gubernatorial appointment, two by legislative
appointment, eight by partisan election,
thirteen by nonpartisan election, and
twenty-three by merit selection. At the
intermediate appellate level, two states
select judges by gubernatorial appointment, two by legislative appointment,
six by partisan election, eleven by nonpartisan election, and eighteen by merit
selection. Finally, at the trial level, three
states select judges by gubernatorial appointment, two by legislative appointment, nine by partisan election, eighteen by nonpartisan election, fourteen
by merit selection, and four by a combination of methods. (Even in states that
employ contested elections, judges are
often initially appointed by governors
to ½ll the unexpired terms of retiring incumbents.)
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Each of the ½ve methods of judicial se-

lection described above had its heyday
at a different point in American history.
Consensus on the optimal method of judicial selection has been elusive. Many
have asserted that this is because there
is no perfect method of judicial selection
–or, more harshly, because there is no
good method of judicial selection.16 A
more charitable explanation may be that
the objective of a good selection system
–an optimal balance between judicial
mission on this point was subsequently adopted by the American Bar Association.

13 Matthew Streb, “Judicial Reform and the
Future of Judicial Elections,” in Running for
Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal
Stakes of Judicial Elections, ed. Streb (New York:
New York University Press, 2007), 205–206.
14 Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the Commission
on the 21st Century Judiciary (American Bar Association, 2003), 76–77. The position of the Com-

15 Data discussed in this paragraph are drawn
from http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelection
Charts.pdf.
16 See, for example, Champagne and Haydel,
“Introduction,” in Judicial Reform in the States,
ed. Champagne and Haydel, 15–16; also Justice
in Jeopardy, 69.
Dædalus Fall 2008
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independence and accountability–is an
ever-moving target that generates perennial calls for reform. In recent years, the
reform engine has been fueled by a series
of developments that have politicized
state judicial elections in arguably unprecedented ways.
Partisan judicial elections can be relatively sleepy affairs in states where a single political party is predominant and
the outcome of judicial races is all but
assured. Conversely, as Alan Tarr, a political scientist at Rutgers University,
observes, where party competition is
intense and parties establish clear ideological identities, the intensity tends to
spill over into judicial elections. In recent years, signi½cant two-party competition has become commonplace in
states and regions that traditionally
were within the control of only one
party:
One of the most dramatic changes during the latter half of the twentieth century was the spread of two party competition throughout the nation. Many states
that at one time were dominated by a single party, particularly in the South and
New England, now regularly conduct
highly competitive elections.17

Studies of judicial reform in North Carolina and Texas link recent selection reform efforts there to the intensi½cation
of two-party competition for judicial of½ce.
As caseloads increased throughout
the twentieth century, states sought
to relieve docket pressures on their supreme courts by establishing intermediate courts of appeals and making their
supreme courts’ appellate jurisdiction
discretionary. Armed with the discre17 G. Alan Tarr, “State Judicial Selection and
Judicial Independence,” Appendix D, in Justice
in Jeopardy, 5.
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tion to set their own agendas, supreme
courts have increasingly allowed the intermediate courts of appeals to have the
½nal word in garden-variety disputes, in
which appellate review is limited to correcting trial-court errors, and con½ned
their dockets to more controversial cases
in which the law is unclear and their primary mission is to “say what the law is.”
The net effect has been to highlight the
policy-making role that state supreme
courts play when ½lling gaps in constitutional and statutory law and making
common law.18
Legal historian Emily Van Tassel explains a related development: “The politicization of state constitutional decision-making coincides with the ‘new
Federalism’ of the Reagan era and the
willingness of many state appellate
courts to look to their own constitutions
for guidance in many areas of law previously left to the federal constitution.”19
That, in turn, has served to “raise the
pro½le of state court judges and make
control over state judgeships seem more
signi½cant to a greater range of interest
groups than in the recent past.”20 To the
extent that judges are perceived as making constitutional policy when called
upon to interpret their constitutions in
new and different ways, it may blur the
distinction between judges and legislators in the public mind and intensify
calls to hold judges politically accountable for their decisions.
18 Paul Carrington, Daniel Meador, and
Maurice Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal (St.
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company,
1976), 150.
19 Emily Van Tassel, “Challenges to Constitutional Decisions of State Courts and
Institutional Pressures on State Judiciaries,”
Appendix E, in Justice in Jeopardy, 3.
20 Ibid.

As two-party competition has intensi½ed and the political pro½le of state
supreme courts has elevated, campaign
spending in judicial races has increased.
Average campaign spending in contested
supreme court races has increased from
$364,348 in 1990 to $892,755 in 2004.21
In 2000, judicial candidates in supreme
court races raised $45 million;22 in 2002,
they raised $29 million; and in 2004,
they raised $42 million.23 While these
numbers appear to vary wildly, when
“outlier” races in Alabama, Illinois,
and West Virginia are excluded, spending in the fourteen remaining states that
held supreme court elections in 2004 increased by 163 percent since 2002, and in
2002 spending increased by 167 percent
since 2000.24 Between 2004 and 2006,
average spending on advertising in supreme court races increased from $1.5
million to $1.6 million; and in that time,
the median amount raised increased
from $201,623 to $243,910.25
When it comes to fund-raising, the
focus of attention has been on supreme
court races, where competition for judicial of½ce has been stiffest. Even so, a
survey of over 2,400 judges conducted

21 Chris Bonneau, “The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections,” in Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 63.
22 The Politicization of the Judiciary (Common
Cause of Ohio, 2005).
23 2004 State Supreme Court Election Overview
(Justice at Stake Campaign, March 9, 2005).
24 Rachel Paine Caul½eld, “The Foreboding
National Trends in Judicial Elections,” conference paper available at http://www.keepmn
justiceimpartial.org/cau½eld_ia_judges_conference.pdf (June 24, 2005), 2.
25 James Sample, Lauren Jones, and Rachel
Weiss, The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2006
(Washington, D.C.: Justice at Stake, 2007), 3.

in 2001 found that 45 percent of lowercourt judges felt under pressure to raise
money for their campaigns during election years, as compared to 36 percent
of high-court judges. In the 2005–2006
election cycle, for example, trial lawyers
and corporate interests in a southern Illinois race combined to give more than
$3.3 million to two candidates for a seat
on the state court of appeals, quadrupling the state record. Madison County,
Illinois, witnessed a $500,000 trial-court
campaign, and a Missouri trial-court
judge was defeated after an out-of-state
group poured $175,000 into a campaign
to defeat him.
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C

oinciding with the introduction of
big-league spending in judicial campaigns and with heightened two-party
competition is the advent of big-league
interest-group involvement, in the form
of direct contributions to judicial candidates and independently organized
campaigns in support of or opposition
to the candidates. The lion’s share of
interest-group spending has been on a
cluster of issues, traveling under the umbrella of “tort reform,” that concern judicial rulings on issues relating to punitive damages, products liability, medical malpractice, and insurance liability.
Plaintiffs’ bar and labor unions, aligned
with Democratic candidates, have been
pitted against the defense bar and business, aligned with Republicans. Thus, in
2006 the two highest sources of contributions were business interests and lawyers, with 44 percent of all funds donated by the former and 21 percent by the
latter. Outside of groups devoted to the
tort reform issue, there have been other
interest groups that have actively sought
to defeat incumbents (sometimes successfully) because of an opinion a judge
wrote or joined on such issues as capital
punishment, criminal sentencing, aborDædalus Fall 2008
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tion, gay rights, education funding, and
water rights.
As James Gibson, a political scientist
at Washington University, notes, “The
use of attack ads in judicial elections is a
relatively new phenomenon.”26 In 2004
and 2006, approximately 20 percent of
all ads were negative. With increased
spending in judicial campaigns and increased interest-group involvement has
come a greater emphasis on negative advertising. In a 2001 poll of judges, 54 percent of trial judges and 54 percent of supreme court justices reported that the
conduct and tone of judicial campaigns
had gotten worse in the preceding ½ve
years. Until quite recently, interest
groups and political parties were responsible for the bulk of negative television
advertising: 90 percent as of 2004. But
in 2006 the candidates themselves sponsored 60 percent of the negative advertising.
Since the 1970s, codes of judicial conduct have imposed signi½cant restrictions on judicial speech and association during judicial campaigns. First,
judges have been subject to restrictions
on what they can say about issues that
may come before them as judges: the
1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct
forbade judges from announcing their
positions on disputed issues (the Announce Clause), while the 1990 and
2007 Model Codes prohibit judicial candidates from making pledges, promises,
or commitments. Second, the codes restrict a judge’s political activities: for
example, judges must not serve as of½cers in, contribute to, or make speeches
on behalf of political organizations;
they must not publicly oppose or en-

dorse other candidates; and they must
not solicit campaign funds other than
through their campaign committees. By
limiting what judges can say and do in
election campaigns, codes of conduct
seek to prevent judicial candidates from
becoming fully embroiled in the political process and from turning judicial
races into referenda on their express
or implied plans to decide future cases
in speci½c ways.
In Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the Announce Clause, holding
that judicial candidates have a First
Amendment right to state their views
on issues that may come before them
later, as judges.27 In the aftermath of
White, the American Bar Association
made modest adjustments to its Model
Code of Judicial Conduct in 2003: it deleted a clause that subjected judges to
discipline for appearing to make commitments (but made apparent commitments a new basis for disquali½cation)
and retained the general prohibitions
on pledges, promises, commitments,
and political activities.
Beginning in 2003, the aba’s Joint
Commission to Evaluate the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct revisited the
Model Code’s restrictions on campaign
speech and conduct, as part of a larger
project to revise the entire Code. The
Commission considered three possible
courses of action.28 First, it considered
embracing the spirit of White by deregulating campaign speech and conduct
generally, as North Carolina had done.
Second, it considered the midrange op-

26 James Gibson, “Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory
and ‘New Style’ Judicial Campaigns,” American
Political Science Review, forthcoming; draft on
½le.

28 I served as coreporter to the Commission
and was in attendance at all Commission meetings. The views expressed here, however, are
my own and are not necessarily shared by the
Commission or its members.
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27 536 U.S. 765 (2002).

tion of retooling the political activities
canon to accommodate some speci½c
post-White rulings of the lower courts,
which would require the Commission
to eliminate several restrictions on political activities and narrow signi½cantly, if not eliminate, the Pledges, Promises, and Commitments Clause. Third, it
considered the conservative approach
of limiting the reach of White to its holding and staying the course pending further clari½cation of White from the Supreme Court.
A majority of the Commission remained concerned that the impact of
White on judicial campaigns was deleterious and was reluctant to deregulate
campaign speech and conduct beyond
what was required by the letter of the
Supreme Court’s holding. After lengthy
deliberations spanning nearly four years,
the Commission effectively chose the
third option described above, retaining
existing restrictions on campaign speech
and conduct in the political activities
canon. Instead, the Commission focused
its efforts on restructuring new Canon 4
(former Canon 5) to improve clarity and
speci½city, as the aba’s Report to the
House of Delegates explained:
Much of the material in Canon 5 was retained, but was reorganized along several
axes. The reorganized Canon 4 differentiates more clearly between sitting judges
who are and are not also judicial candidates and nonjudges who become candidates. Canon 4 continues to differentiate
between judicial candidates running for
public elections and those seeking appointment, and, within the former category, it further differentiates between
partisan, nonpartisan and retention elections.29

In the aftermath of White, judicial candidates have challenged remaining restrictions on their campaign speech and
conduct in the lower courts, and while
the results have been somewhat mixed,
the trend has favored the challengers.
Several courts have invalidated the
Pledges and Promises Clause, while others have struck down restrictions on political activities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, revisiting
other issues presented by the White case
on remand from the Supreme Court,
held that Minnesota could not discipline
judicial candidates for engaging in partisan activities (notwithstanding Minnesota’s purported interest in preserving
the nonpartisan character of its judicial
elections) or bypassing their campaign
committees and soliciting funds directly
from groups.30
Since 2002, when White was decided,
interest groups on the political left and
right have capitalized on the decision by
submitting questionnaires to the candidates that solicit the candidates’ views
on a range of issues likely to come before
them as judges and that the candidates
ignore at their peril. Indeed, some interest groups have been explicit about supporting only those candidates that respond.
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Judicial elections were originally intro-

duced primarily to promote judicial independence by liberating judges from
the control of governors and legislators,
but they have since morphed into tools
that serve primarily to promote judicial
accountability. There seems to be a general consensus that the recent developments described above are making judi200, Revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(February 12–13, 2007).

29 aba Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Report No.

30 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Dædalus Fall 2008
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cial elections look and feel more like
conventional political branch races,
in the sense of being more competitive
and costly, with more interest groups
taking sides in more acrimonious contests, and more candidates taking positions on the often policy-laden issues
that the candidates will be called upon
to resolve as of½ce-holders. Where the
consensus breaks down is as to whether
these developments are welcome and
which judicial selection system is best
suited to counter or accommodate them.
Contemporary proponents of partisan judicial elections proceed from the
premise that, in a democratic republic,
voters should choose the public of½cials who govern them and hold them
accountable for their performance in
of½ce. Underlying this premise is the
general assumption that judges are not
signi½cantly different from other public of½cials, or are not different in ways
that warrant a different system of selection. A related assumption is that voters
in judicial and political branch races are
comparably motivated and equipped to
distinguish good candidates from bad
–or at least that voters in judicial races
are not so unmotivated and ill-equipped
as to undermine the legitimacy of the
choices they make.
In an article I wrote several years ago,
I questioned whether voters in judicial
elections were adequately motivated and
informed to hold judges accountable in
a meaningful way, by pointing to data
showing that a substantial majority of
the public did not vote in judicial races
and was unfamiliar with the candidates.
Recent research suggests that my concern was well-founded in traditional,
less-competitive races. Available data
con½rm an often substantial “roll-off”
in judicial races, in which voters who
come to the polls vote in executive and
legislative branch races but not in judiDædalus Fall 2008

cial. The roll-off is commonly attributed
to a lack of information about the candidates; indeed, in a poll of American voters conducted in 2001, 73 percent reported that they had only some or a little information about judicial candidates,
while 14 percent reported having none.31
In their study of judicial elections in the
news, Brian Schaffner and Jennifer Segal
Diascro, political scientists at American
University, conclude, “We should not
be surprised to ½nd citizens lacking information about judicial races” because
“citizens turning to newspapers for information on state supreme court campaigns will ½nd a dearth of coverage on
these contests.”32
It can be argued, however, that more
competitive judicial races, particularly in
a post-White environment, are increasing voter interest and information levels
enough to hold judges meaningfully accountable. In a comparison between two
Ohio Supreme Court races, political scientists Laurence Baum and David Klein
found that the voter roll-off rate was
twice as high for the low visibility race
as for the hotly contested one (although
they also found that in the hotly contested race, voters acquired only a slender
grasp of the issues at stake).33 Melinda
31 Martin P. Wattenberg, Ian McAllister, and
Anthony Salvanto, “How Voting is Like Taking
an sat Test: An Analysis of American Voter
Rolloff,” American Politics Quarterly 28 (2000):
234; Lawrence Baum and David Klein, “Voter
Responses to High-Visibility Judicial Campaigns,” in Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 140–
141; Poll of American Voters, conducted by
Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research Inc.
(Justice at Stake Campaign, 2001).
32 Brian Schaffner and Jennifer Segal Diascro,
“Judicial Elections in the News,” in Running for
Judge, ed. Streb, 115, 134.
33 Baum and Klein, “Voter Responses to HighVisibility Campaigns,” in Running for Judge, ed.
Streb.

Gann Hall, a political scientist at Michigan State University, observes, “Without
the excitement generated by hard-fought
campaigns from contending candidates,
information upon which to cast votes is
poor, and voters are disinterested and
unmotivated to participate.”34 Now that
judicial elections have become noisier,
nastier, and costlier, we have more challengers and more defeated incumbents,
leading Hall to conclude, “When we
consider tangible indicators of electoral
accountability, we see that, under most
situations, supreme court elections perform quite well, particularly in the last
decade or so.”35 Rachel Paine Caul½eld,
a political scientist at Drake University,
found that in the post-White era, states
that have deregulated judicial speech
the most “are seeing a change in how
candidates promote themselves and
how they attack their opponents,” leading her to conclude that “it is entirely
possible that judicial candidates in these
states will increasingly rely on the ability to distinguish themselves from their
opponents based on controversial issue
positions.”36 Schaffner and Diascro concur that, after White, “candidates may be
more likely to speak out on a wider array
of topics during campaigns, a dynamic
that would produce more news for reporters to cover,” which they view as a
welcome development “if judicial elections are to compel accountability in the
judiciary.”37
34 Melinda Gann Hall, “Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections,” in Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 166.
35 Ibid., 183.
36 Rachel Paine Caul½eld, “The Changing Tone
of Judicial Campaigns as a Result of White,” in
Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 34, 55–56.
37 Schaffner and Diascro, “Judicial Elections in
the News,” in Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 136.

Recent data thus reveal that the brave
new world of expensive, high-pro½le,
hotly contested judicial races creates
greater voter interest, puts incumbents
at higher risk of defeat, and to that extent promotes unvarnished, speci½cally
political “accountability.”38 And since
competition is the most intense in partisan races, the argument concludes, it is
in partisan races that judicial accountability of this kind will be promoted most
effectively.
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The critical question is whether this is

the kind of accountability that we want
judicial elections to promote. If, as a signi½cant segment of the political science
community believes, independent judges are essentially unconstrained policymakers who decide cases by acting on
their personal preferences or attitudes,
then the answer would seem to be yes,
because elections will produce public
policies that better represent the citizenry by creating incentives for judges
to pay attention to citizen preferences
when deciding highly visible and publicly salient issues.
If, on the other hand, as the mainstream legal community believes, independent judges do their best to follow
the law, flexibly de½ned (consistent with
the legal model described at the beginning of this paper), then the answer is
presumably no, because elections create
incentives for judges to set the law to one
side and pay attention to citizen preferences when deciding cases. Indeed, the
judge who openly defers to the electorate’s preferences when deciding cases
exposes herself to discipline and removal for violating multiple rules in
the Code of Judicial Conduct: the duty
38 Hall, “Competition as Accountability in
State Supreme Court Elections,” in Running
for Judge, ed. Streb, 166.
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not to be swayed by public clamor or
fear of criticism; the duty to uphold
and apply the law and perform all duties of judicial of½ce impartially; and
the duty to act at all times in a manner
that promotes public con½dence in the
independence and impartiality of the
judiciary. The attitudinal model of judicial decision-making that drives the
thinking of many political scientists is
only now beginning to be challenged in
a serious way by scholars within the legal community,39 and the implications
for judicial selection are considerable.
Devotees of nonpartisan elections
proceed from the assumption that judges are different from other elected of½cials in ways that justify a different selection process: whereas governors and
legislators may follow partisan agendas,
judges must follow the law. Those who
favor nonpartisan elections worry that
recent politicization of judicial races has
made politicians of judges, whose election increasingly turns on their currying favor with contributors, interest
groups, and voters by signaling in advance how they are likely to rule on hotbutton legal issues that may come before their courts. They argue, however,
that the worst excesses have occurred
in partisan election states, where judicial candidates are, by de½nition, partisans and where competition for judicial of½ce has been most intense.
Data con½rm that partisan races are,
on average, more heated than nonpartisan. The spending difference between
partisan and nonpartisan races is stark:
between 1990 and 2004, average spending in contested nonpartisan elections
was $549,160, as compared to $885,177
39 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, The Supreme
Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993);
Barry Friedman, “Taking Law Seriously,” Perspectives on Politics 4 (2006): 261.
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in partisan races. Overall, the percentage of supreme court races in which
the incumbent ran unopposed has been
16.9 percent higher in nonpartisan contests. And between 1980 and 2000 defeat rates for incumbents in nonpartisan races were 7.3 percent as compared
to 23 percent in partisan races. One explanation for this data, however, may
be that nonpartisan races are less politicized because they furnish voters with
insuf½cient information to promote
competitive races; partisan af½liation
can serve as a rough proxy for the candidate’s views on a range of issues that
furnish voters with information they
deem relevant to casting an informed
ballot. That said, nonpartisan races
have recently become much more competitive affairs. In the 1980s, 40.8 percent of nonpartisan judicial elections
were contested, as compared to 62.5
percent in the 1990s. (In partisan races,
the percentage of contested races increased from 58.8 percent to 83.1 percent.) And a recent study conducted
by Matthew Streb found that so-called
nonpartisan races may not be as nonpartisan as commonly assumed:
How involved are party organizations in
nonpartisan judicial campaigns? The answer appears to be that they are quite involved. While parties are not equally active in all aspects of nonpartisan judicial
elections (and not necessarily active in
every election cycle), they seem to be especially important in terms of gotv efforts and increasing name recognition,
candidate recruitment, candidate endorsements, coordinating campaigns
with candidates, and even raising and
contributing money.40

40 Streb, “Partisan Involvement in Partisan
and Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections,” in
Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 96, 102.

Of greater concern, perhaps, is the

impact of White on the future of nonpartisan elections. If candidates are
held to have a constitutional right to
announce their partisan af½liations
and engage in partisan activities in
nonpartisan races, as the U.S. Court
of Appeals ruled in White on remand,
the practical differences between partisan and nonpartisan elections may
gradually disappear. We have already
seen, in states such as Michigan and
Ohio, where a nominally nonpartisan
general election is preceded by an openly partisan primary election process,
that the resulting contests can be every
bit as heated as in conventional partisan election states. In light of data indicating that when, in response to White,
states relax campaign speech regulations, candidates alter their campaign
speech to capitalize on the relaxed requirements, it is reasonable to predict
that the same will occur if partisan activities restrictions are lifted.
Advocates of merit selection, like proponents of nonpartisan election, proceed from the premise that a judge’s duty to follow the law makes judges suf½ciently different from other public of½cials to warrant a different method of
selection. The two camps part company,
however, over the relative merits of contested elections. Supporters of merit selection operate on three assumptions.
First, contested elections are not a good
way to ensure the selection of capable
and quali½ed judges. Second, contested
elections are inimical to judicial independence because they put judges at risk
of losing their jobs for making decisions
that are unpopular with voters who are
incapable of discerning when a judge has
followed the law, committed an honest
error, or made an illegitimate power
grab. Third, politicization of judicial selection in hotly contested races dimin-

ishes public con½dence in the courts.
A system in which governors appoint
judges from a pool of candidates prequali½ed by an independent commission, they maintain, is better suited to
ensure that judges are selected on the
basis of merit. To accommodate entrenched public preferences for judicial elections, merit selection systems
typically provide for retention elections
that proponents assume, by virtue of
being non-competitive, are less likely
to become highly politicized, independence-threatening affairs that diminish
public con½dence in the courts.
Available data undercut the assumption that merit selection systems produce “better” judges. A study conducted
in the 1980s comparing the résumés of
judges chosen in contested elections and
in merit selection systems found no signi½cant differences: they possess comparable legal and judicial experience,
and elected judges were no more likely
than their merit-selected counterparts
to have partisan political backgrounds.41
(Recent research reveals, too, that there
is no meaningful difference between the
systems in terms of the racial or gender
diversity of the judges selected.42) That
said, it is more dif½cult to quantify intangibles that could support the conclusion that merit-selected judges are “better” quali½ed, such as whether, on aver-
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41 Henry Glick and Craig Emmert, “Selection
Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges,” Judicature 70 (1987): 231–235.
42 Mark Hurwitz and Drew Noble Lanier,
“Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to
Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate
Courts,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 3
(2003): 345. For earlier research, see Malia
Reddick, “Merit Selection: A Review of the
Social Scienti½c Literature,” Dickinson Law
Review 106 (2002): 740–741.
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age, they possess a more judicial temperament, are predisposed to be more impartial and independent, or think about
the judicial role in less partisan or otherwise political ways. A California study,
for example, compared judges initially
appointed to those initially elected and
found that between 1990 and 1999, 29.8
out of every thousand judges initially appointed had been disciplined, as compared to 43.6 out of every thousand judges who had been initially elected.43
Recent data appear to corroborate
the assumption that elected judges are
more likely to align their decision-making with popular preferences than appointed judges, and to that extent are
less independent. In their study of state
supreme court review of capital cases,
political scientists Paul Brace and Brent
Boyea found “compelling but circumstantial evidence that state supreme
court judges in capital cases may vote
with an eye toward the next election,”
and that “appointed judges and judges
that are retiring all exhibit a higher propensity to overturn capital convictions
than elective judges who are not retiring,”44 leading Brace and Boyea to a
conclusion worth quoting at length:
In the end, the patterns revealed here indicate that judicial elections expose judges to public sentiment and, on this very
salient issue at least, they respond by adjusting their voting in a manner that is
consistent with public opinion. On this
particular issue too, elections serve to
recruit judges who share the public’s values. Elections thus function in a manner
43 Commission on Judicial Performance, Summary of Disciplinary Statistics (State of California, 1990–1999), 13.

commonly valued in some democratic
theories, producing elite responsiveness
to mass opinions. When it comes to judicial elections, however, our ½ndings may
give pause to those who value judicial impartiality, particularly when it comes to a
matter of life and death.45

Research reveals that in merit selection systems, politics can play a role in
selecting members of nominating commissions, in the deliberations of such
commissions, and in the judges that governors ultimately choose from the approved candidate pool. In response, the
American Bar Association has developed
standards for judicial selection that underscore the importance of preserving
the independent, nonpartisan character
of judicial nominating commissions.46
To conclude from these developments,
however–as some have–that merit selection systems simply move the politics
of judicial selection from the ballot box
to a back room misses an important
point: the primary threat to independence arises at the point of reselection,
when judges are put at risk of losing
their jobs for unpopular decisions that
they previously made. And on that score
there is ample support for the conclusion that, with notable exceptions, the
prospect of an incumbent losing her
seat in a retention election because of
isolated, unpopular decisions is quite
low. Whereas 23 percent of incumbent
supreme court justices lost reelection
bids in partisan elections between 1980
and 2000, and 7.4 percent lost in nonpartisan races, the failure rate in retention elections was only 1.8 percent. And
between 1964 and 1998 only 52 of 4,588
45 Ibid., 199.

44 Paul Brace and Brent Boyea, “Judicial Selection Methods and Capital Punishment in
the American States,” in Running for Judge, ed.
Streb, 186, 193–194, 197.
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46 Report of the Commission on State Judicial
Selection Standards (American Bar Association,
2000).

candidates in retention elections were
not retained.47
Finally, there is support for the conclusion that highly politicized judicial
races diminish public con½dence in the
courts. In his Kentucky-based study,
James Gibson found that “when groups
with direct connections to the decisionmaker give contributions, legitimacy
suffers substantially.”48 He likewise
found that when candidates use attack
ads, legitimacy is adversely affected, albeit to a lesser degree. Gibson also explored the impact of candidate positiontaking on public con½dence and found
none, adding that “even promises to decide cases in speci½c ways have no consequences at all for the legitimacy of the
institution”–although his conclusion
on this point may overgeneralize from
the answers he received to a narrowly
focused question.
I have argued elsewhere that the optimal system for judicial selection is
one in which judges are appointed by
governors from a pool of commissionapproved candidates, with or without
legislative con½rmation, who, once appointed, are not subject to reselection
(via reappointment, retention election,
or contested election).49 Such arguments operate from the premise that
an appointive system alone promotes
judicial independence by ensuring that
a judge will not be put at risk of losing
her job for making unpopular decisions
that comport with the law as the judge

reads it. Proponents of appointive systems assume that accountability is better promoted by means other than the
ballot box: appellate review, constitutional amendment, adverse publicity,
intrajudicial disciplinary processes,
and, of course, prospective accountability fostered by the appointment
process itself.
Although few judges actually lose their
retention bids in merit selection states,
the real issue is whether judges nonetheless fear defeat at the ballot box and act
on that fear by deciding cases differently
than they otherwise would. Malia Reddick, director of research and programs
for the American Judicature Society, reports on a 1991 survey of judges who recently stood for retention, in which
three-½fths of respondents reported that
“retention elections had a pronounced
effect on their behavior on the bench”;
only 14 percent believed that retention
elections gave them independence from
the voters, while “the remaining judges
perceived themselves as responding to
their environment.”50
As far as other accountability-promoting mechanisms are concerned,
the model codes of judicial conduct
include rules directing judges to be
“faithful to” or to “uphold and apply”
the law.51 These rules have been used
more often than one might suppose to
discipline and sometimes remove judicial of½cers who chronically or flagrantly disregard the rule of law in a
range of contexts.
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47 Larry Aspin, “Trends in Judicial Retention
Elections, 1964–1998,” Judicature 83 (1999): 79.
48 James Gibson, “Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts,” 17; see also,
Charles Gardner Geyh, “Why Judicial Elections Stink,” Ohio State Law Journal 64 (2002):
54–55.
49 Ibid.; also Justice in Jeopardy, 70–74.

50 Malia Reddick, “Merit Selection,” 739–740,
which discusses Larry Aspin and William Hall,
“Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior,” Judicature 77 (1994): 306.
51 aba Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(2) (1990); Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.2 (2007).
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Ultimately, which of the various sys-

tems for judicial selection is “best” depends upon what one is looking for. If
one is looking for a system that maximizes democratic accountability, then
available data suggest that partisan elections will ordinarily be optimal. Conversely, if one is looking for a system
that maximizes judicial independence,
simple appointment (with or without a
nominating commission) that does not
subject incumbents to a reselection process, will usually be the best bet. Nonpartisan election and merit selection/
retention election systems seek to strike
a balance between these relative extremes, with nonpartisan election systems placing somewhat greater emphasis on democratic accountability and
merit selection/retention elections opting for somewhat greater independence.
Arguments over the relative merits of
democratic accountability and judicial
independence may be deeply normative,
but turn in large part on an unresolved
empirical question of considerable importance: whether independent judges
follow the law and, if so, how and to
what extent. If the answer is no, as many
political scientists believe, then the primary justi½cation for judicial independence disappears. If law does not constrain judges in any meaningful way–
if independent judges are essentially
rogue policy-makers–the norms of a
democratic republic dictate that judges
be brought under greater popular control, so that the preferences judges act
upon are better aligned with their “constituents.” Conversely, if, as most judges
and lawyers believe, the answer is to
some signi½cant extent yes–if independent judges do indeed take law seriously–then judicial independence is back
in the game. To study this question demands a more serious interdisciplinary
effort than has occurred to date–and
Dædalus Fall 2008

that is no mean feat. Too many political
scientists and lawyers look at each other
and shake their heads, so captured by
the predispositions of their respective
disciplines that they are unable or unwilling to take the other seriously.52 For
those who have been struggling to preserve and promote an independent judiciary, however, the time has come to
con½rm the empirical foundations upon
which their case rests, or rethink their
premises.
I share New York University law professor Barry Friedman’s impressionistic
sense that, outside the political science
sub½eld of attitudinal model scholars,
“most likely there is agreement that attitudes and law both play a role–the question is how much, and more particularly,
how much law can constrain. To state it
differently, the question is not so much
whether law plays a role, as what role
it plays.”53 If so, then judicial independence remains a value worth preserving.
But the operative question continues to
be how much independence in relation
to democratic accountability is optimal?
Put another way, when (if ever) does the
cost of enabling judges to act upon their
political preferences or attitudes by insulating them from democratic accountability exceed the bene½ts of protecting
them from threats to their tenure that
compromise their capacity to adhere to
the rule of law?
These are big questions that call for
big choices between selection systems.
Constitutional reform culminating in
changes on this order of magnitude is a
rare event. It can be a worthy goal and

52 For an excellent discussion of the divide that
separates academic lawyers and political scientists, see Friedman, “Taking Law Seriously.”
53 Ibid., 264.

one well worth pursuing (as I have argued elsewhere), but not at the expense
of ignoring shorter-term remedies that
can make a bad system better in the interim. For those seeking to promote an
independent judiciary in the teeth of recent developments, more modest reforms proposed by scholars and organizations include:
•

Increasing the length of judicial terms,
to reduce the frequency with which judicial tenure is put at risk;54

•

Encouraging candidates to adopt voluntary campaign standards, to reduce
negative campaigning and thwart the
impact of White;55

•

Continuing to defend existing ethical
restrictions on judicial campaign conduct against constitutional challenge,
at least until the Supreme Court clari½es the limits of White;56

•

Developing more comprehensive judicial evaluation programs to provide
voters in retention elections with more

54 Roy A. Schotland, “The Crocodile in the
Bathtub . . . and Other Arguments to Extend
Terms for Trial Judges,” California Courts Review 10 (Fall 2005); “Call to Action: Statement
of the National Summit on Improving Judicial
Selection,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 34
(2001): 1355.
55 Charles Gardner Geyh, “Preserving Public
Con½dence in the Courts in an Age of Individual Rights and Public Skepticism,” in Bench
Press: The Collision of the Courts, Politics, and the
Media, ed. Keith Bybee (Stanford: Stanford Law
and Politics, 2007). See also, The Constitution
Project, Higher Ground Standards of Conduct
for Judicial Candidates; at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/The_Higher_Ground
_Standards_of_Conduct_for_Judicial_Candidates.pdf.
56 Geyh, “Preserving Public Con½dence in the
Courts in an Age of Individual Rights and Public Skepticism,” in Bench Press, ed. Bybee.

meaningful information about incumbents that reorient voter focus toward
behavioral, rather than decisional, accountability;57
•

Increasing public knowledge about the
role of the judiciary in American government, which has been shown to increase public support for judicial independence;58

•

Taking judicial discipline seriously, as a
means to underscore an important way
in which judges who behave badly are
properly held accountable;59

•

Public ½nancing of judicial campaigns
at the appellate level, to reduce the influence of money on judicial races;60

•

Expanding use of voter guides as a
means to inform voters better about
the candidates.61
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57 Seth Andersen, “Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
34 (2001): 1375.
58 James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira, “Knowing About Courts,” Paper for the 2nd Annual
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies; on ½le.
59 Justice in Jeopardy, 58–59.
60 The Report of the Commission on Public
Financing of Judicial Campaigns (American
Bar Association, 2002); but see Michael Malbin and Thomas Gais, The Day After Reform:
Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the
American States (Albany, N.Y.: Rockefeller Institute Press, 1998), which questions the viability of public ½nancing.
61 “Call to Action,” 1357.
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